The Gay Invention – Homosexuality is a linguistic as well as a moral error
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by R. V. Young
For thousands of years, until the late 1800s, our ancestors were completely oblivious to the existence of a fundamentally distinct class of human beings. Indeed, during the long period of Greco-Roman antiquity and more than a millennium and a half of Christian civilization, man did not even have a name for this class.
Or so asserts an almost universal assumption fixed in the language almost everyone uses: that â€œheterosexualsâ€ and â€œhomosexualsâ€ are two permanently and innately different kinds of human being, and that â€œsexual orientationâ€ constitutes a difference comparable to the difference between male and female. Widespread acceptance of â€œhomosexualityâ€ and associated terms thus biases discussion of the subject before an argument is even formulated.
What might be called the philological evidence calls this notion into question. If it were true, someone would long ago have given this class a name. That no one did until very recently suggests that the notion is not true.
In the first footnote of the first chapter of Greek Homosexuality, which is generally regarded as the definitive treatment of its subject, Oxford classical scholar K. J. Dover points out that the ancient Greek language â€œhas no nouns corresponding to the English nouns â€˜a homosexualâ€™ and â€˜a heterosexualâ€™.â€ Such an observation would seem to call for more notice than is accorded by a single short footnote, but even the apparent concession is misleading, insofar as it suggests that the absence of these terms is a peculiarity of Greek.
In fact, Latin also lacks these terms and the same is true of Old and Middle English. Among modern European languages the word that corresponds to the English â€œhomosexualâ€ is generally a variant on the same word: in Spanish homosexual and in Dutch homoseksueel, for example. German also offers gleichgeschlechtlich, which is simply a combination of two Germanic roots, gleich and Geschlecht, that correspond to the Greek (homo = same) and Latin (sexus = sex) of the English word.
This English word is itself a very recent coinage. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, both â€œhomosexualâ€ and â€œhomosexualityâ€ first appeared in English in 1892, along with â€œheterosexualâ€ and â€œheterosexuality,â€ in an English translation of Richard von Kraft-Ebingâ€™s Psychopathologia Sexualis (1886) and turn up again five years later in Havelock Ellisâ€™s Studies in the Psychology of Sex.
In other words, only in the late nineteenth century, when physicians began discussing sexual perversion as a medical rather than a moral problem in Latin treatises intended only for the learned and required a neutral, clinical term, was there a perceived need to refer to â€œhomosexuality.â€ Moreover, it is not at all clear that the originators of the term had precisely in mind what is usually meant by â€œhomosexualityâ€ in contemporary parlance.
Kraft-Ebing, for example, does not write a separate chapter on this subject (Ellis, however, does); same-sex attraction is rather an attribute or additional characteristic of other specific activitiesâ€”regarded by Kraft-Ebing as abuses of the sexual organs and the pleasure associated with erotic stimulation. Ellis says that the term actually originated in 1869 with an obscure Hungarian doctor, Benkert (or Kertbeny), and endorses its use because â€œits significanceâ€”sexual attraction to the same sexâ€”is fairly clear and definite, while it is free of any question-begging association of either favorable or unfavorable character.â€
The Greek Example
Contemporary advocates of â€œhomosexualityâ€ often invoke the Greek example to make acts of sodomy seem acceptable or even normal. They assume that the Greeks believed in â€œhomosexualityâ€ in the modern sense because some Greeks praised the erotic relations of men and boys; they read the Greeks as if they were modern Americans or Europeans.
Of course our ancestors were quite aware of what are now called â€œhomosexualâ€ acts or behavior. Latin and Greek are both rich in words that designate the penetrating member and the penetrated orifices, as well as the active and passive participants. Interested readers may find in J. N. Adamsâ€™s The Latin Sexual Vocabulary an abundance of such terms (usually with Greek counterparts). Almost all of them are obscene as well as pejorative, and their usage is almost always in a context of coarse humor or insult.
Clear verbal distinctions are drawn between those who take the active, male role and those who assume the passive female rÃ´le; men who submit in the latter fashion are almost universally regarded with contempt, since they are ordinarily slaves or male prostitutes. The only real exception seems to come in the ancient Greek city-states with the pubescent boy (eromenos) who is the beloved of an older man (erastes), who is ideally a kind of intellectual mentor as well as lover to the youth.
This situation is discussed at length in Platoâ€™s Symposium (discussed in more detail shortly), and this is the principal cultural phenomenon that provides Dover the opportunity to give a generally favorable account of â€œGreek homosexuality.â€ But his account undermines the claim implied in the title of his book. He begins his study by defining â€œhomosexualityâ€ as â€œthe disposition to seek sensory pleasure through bodily contact with persons of oneâ€™s own sex in preference to contact with the other sex.â€ â€œDispositionâ€ suggests a condition considerably less permanent or innate than the term â€œsexual orientation,â€ which has become a fixture in current discourse.
Still more revealing is Doverâ€™s rationalization of the absence of a Greek word for â€œhomosexualâ€ in that first, uncomfortable footnote. The Greeks, he wrote, â€œassumed . . . that (a) virtually everyone responds at different times both to homosexual and to heterosexual stimuli, and (b) virtually no male both penetrates other males and submits to penetration by other males at the same stage in his life.â€
This explanation amounts to an admission that the ancient Greeks did not recognize the existence of the permanent â€œhomosexual orientationâ€ that is nowadays taken as a given: â€œSince the reciprocal desire of partners belonging to the same age-category is virtually unknown in Greek homosexuality,â€ Dover remarks, â€œthe distinction between the bodily activity of the one who has fallen in love and the bodily passivity of the one with whom he has fallen in love is of the highest importance.â€
In a very defensive â€œPostscriptâ€ to the 1989 edition, Dover feels constrained to defend â€œmy inclination to treat homosexuality as â€˜quasi-sexualityâ€™ or â€˜pseudo-sexualityâ€™. My reasoning was simple: we have the word â€˜sexâ€™ because there is more than one sex, definable in terms of reproductive function, and I accordingly use â€˜sexualâ€™ to mean â€˜having to do with (difference of) sexâ€™.â€ This acknowledgment that â€œheterosexualâ€ and â€œhomosexualâ€ are incommensurable with â€œmaleâ€ and â€œfemaleâ€ or â€œmanâ€ and â€œwomanâ€ practically dismantles the significance of Doverâ€™s title.
Platoâ€™s Symposium is the most prominent work that seems to provide evidence for the notion that â€œhomosexualityâ€ was a normal and accepted aspect of ancient Greek society, since all but one of the characters in the dialogue gives a speech in praise of the god of love (Eros) and specifically designates pederasty, the desire of a man for a youth, as the ultimate expression of love.
The speech attributed to the comic playwright Aristophanes even suggests that â€œsexual orientationâ€ is a permanent feature of human beings, since desire is, literally, a longing to be reunited with our â€œother half.â€ Human beings were once, he says, creatures with four legs and four arms, two faces and two sets of genitals, and so on. Anxious about the threat of such formidable creatures, Zeus used his thunderbolts to split them in half, creating men and women as we know them now.
If oneâ€™s other half were of the opposite sex in this mythical past, then he desires physical intimacy with a member of the opposite sex; but if oneâ€™s other half were of the same sex, then union with the opposite sex fails to satisfy. It is difficult to judge the tone and import of this myth, especially as Aristophanes disparaged Platoâ€™s mentor Socrates in his comedy, the Clouds; but in any case it hardly constitutes a philosophical endorsement of same-sex erotic relationships.
There are, however, substantial reasons for finding the status of â€œhomosexualityâ€ in the Symposium problematic. The dialogue is set at a dinner party celebrating Agathonâ€™s victory in the Athenian tragedy competition. The guests are all artists and intellectualsâ€”hardly a representative sample of moral opinion in fifth-century B.C. Athens.
Moreover, the one speaker who does not praise Eros as the inspiration of â€œboy-loveâ€ (paiderastia) is Socrates. Having declared himself incapable of matching the splendidly rhetorical speeches of the others, he instead expounds the wisdom of the â€œprophetessâ€ Diotima (a nicely ironic touch, since so many of the other speakers admit to preferring boys because they find women so contemptible). According to her, Socrates says, the desire aroused by the sight of a beautiful body should lead us to seek not physical gratification, but rather the beauty of the soul, of which the body is merely an ephemeral expression, and this in turn should lead us up the steps of the â€œladder of loveâ€ until we contemplate the Idea of the Beautiful itself.
A â€œPlatonic relationshipâ€ is thus a spiritual affection, not a carnal satisfaction. The drunken tirade of the latecomer Alcibiades, which brings the dialogue to a close, ruefully upbraids Socrates for having refused his effort at seduction, thus making the point about Socratesâ€™ chastity clear for anyone who has missed it.
Yet the most revealing qualification of the praise of boy-love in the Symposium is not Socratesâ€™ exaltation of the idea of purely spiritual love, but a digressive comment in the discourse of the sophist Pausanias who, having denigrated the love of women and even of immature boys, concedes that even in Athens not everyone is happy about erotic relationships between men and youths. If a man finds out that another man seeks to become the lover of his son, Pausanias complains, the father puts the boy in the charge of a tutor who is instructed to keep the lover away. If the other boys find out about it, they ridicule the one who has drawn the attraction of the older man.
Thus even in Athens many men are uneasy about pederasty, failing to distinguish between the mere sensual indulgence of the followers of the â€œearthly Aphroditeâ€ and the gratification of a virtuous lover, a follower of the â€œheavenly Aphrodite,â€ who really has the boyâ€™s interest at heart. Given the genuinely transcendent vision of love offered by Socrates later in the dialogue, it is hard to see Pausaniasâ€™s complaint as anything but a sample of ironically undercut special pleading.
A Kind of Fornication
Severe condemnation of any deviation from procreative sexuality seems, however, to have been in force in the ancient world only among the Hebrews, but it was incorporated into both the morality and the law of the Christian society emerging at the end of classical antiquity and became the standard view of the Western world.
On the basis of Genesis 19, Christians applied the term â€œsodomyâ€ specifically to erotic acts between persons of the same sex. In his typically brisk, dispassionate style, St. Thomas Aquinas classifies â€œsodomitical viceâ€ among â€œthe species of lust contrary to nature,â€ and says that it is not quite so grave a sin as bestiality, but worse than the failure of a man and woman to observe â€œthe proper manner of lying together.â€
The worst form of this last is neglecting to observe the use of â€œthe appropriate organ,â€ meaning the deposit of semen somewhere other than in the vagina rather than â€œsome other disorder pertaining to the mode of copulation.â€ Obviously, sodomy between persons of the same sex is further down the scale of vice and a graver sin because it necessarily excludes the use of the proper organ.
St. Thomas thus points out that while even simple fornication is â€œagainst properly human nature, of which the act of generation is ordered to the appropriate education of children,â€ sodomy is â€œagainst the nature of every animalâ€ because it is not aimed at generation at all. Nevertheless, actions today designated â€œhomosexualâ€ are for Thomas just one manifestation of lust among others; the commission of such sins, even the persistent desire to commit such sins, does not constitute a particular class of persons.
Writing for university theology students, St. Thomas is considerably more explicit on the subject than most Christian writers. The author of a fourteenth-century preacherâ€™s manual, Fasciculus Morum, calls sodomy a â€œdiabolical sin against natureâ€ and passes over it â€œwith horror, leaving it for others to expoundâ€ and Chaucerâ€™s Parson likewise calls it â€œthilke abhomynable synne, of which that no man unnethe oghte speke ne write.â€
Scriptural writers likewise tend to be reticent on the subject: The epistle of Jude, for example, refers to the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah as fornication and, in a curious circumlocution, the pursuit of â€œother flesh,â€ and in writing to the Ephesians St. Paul shrinks from mentioning â€œthings . . . done by them in secretâ€ that â€œit is a shame even to speak of.â€ This reluctance even to name or describe sodomy and other forms of lechery seems to undermine the argument that sodomy is of little consequence in the Bible because it is mentioned infrequently.
Although the lecherous act defined as sodomy is simply a sin like any other, its implications are grave, since in Romans St. Paul describes this particular sin as a punishment for the prior sin of unbelief, of a refusal to acknowledge God. From his perspective sodomy results not from an innate condition, â€œhomosexuality,â€ but from faithlessness. Similarly, the popular argument that Paul meant that sodomy is only a sin when it is committed by those who are â€œnot really homosexuals,â€ is (at best) problematic, since the authors of sacred Scripture, like the ancient Greeks and Romans, did not recognize the category, â€œhomosexual,â€ for which they had no term.
A Gay Argument
To be sure, some men and women who identify themselves as â€œgayâ€ also reject the label â€œhomosexual,â€ or are at least indifferent to it. This viewpoint is very much in evidence, for example, in the essays and excerpts collected under the title Reclaiming Sodom, where we learn from Jonathan Ned Katz about the very different view of the matter in colonial New England:
As sin, sodomy was an act â€œcommittedâ€ or not â€œcommitted,â€ an act (and inclination) for which one was â€œguiltyâ€ or â€œnot guilty,â€ ashamed or unashamed. As sin, the act of sodomy might be taught by â€œbadâ€ example, but no one thought (as did late-Victorian doctors) of distinguishing between â€œacquiredâ€ sodomy and â€œcongenital.â€ A sodomitical impulse was an inherent potential of all fallen male descendants of Eve and Adam. Only in the twentieth century would the doctorsâ€™ allegedly objective and scientific concept of â€œhomosexualityâ€ hide the negative value judgment explicit in the colonial concept of sodomy as a sin.
The candor of this passage is admirable even if one does not accept Katzâ€™s belief that the attitudes of the New England Puritans toward sex are irrelevant to us. We study them, he asserts, because â€œperceiving our own sex and affection as a historical, socially constructed form we better understand the possibility of reconstructing it.â€
Similarly, on the bookâ€™s first page, the editor, Jonathan Goldberg, extols â€œthe productive role that sodomy has played and can play as a site of pleasures that are also refusals of normative categoriesâ€ (emphasis in original). In other words, to engage in sodomy is a deliberate means of rejecting traditional moral standards, what Goldberg elsewhere calls â€œheteronormativity.â€ This attitude vindicates St. Paulâ€™s assertion that â€œuse which is against natureâ€ is punishment for those â€œwho changed the truth of God into a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator.â€
The â€œgayâ€ liberation movement, like feminism, is a branch of the wider sexual revolution that depends upon the postulate that traditional morality is false and untenable because it assumes a stable human nature with corresponding norms of conductâ€”moral absolutes, in other words. Modern relativism has always maintained to the contrary that our â€œsexualityâ€ is like every other human capacity and attitude, â€œconstructedâ€ by our social milieu; in Marxist terms it is an ideological â€œsuperstructureâ€ arising from the inexorable evolution of the material â€œbase.â€
Hence what we call our â€œnatureâ€ is really no more than a temporary accommodation to social pressures generated by the forces of the human environment; hence men commit sodomy not because they are innately â€œhomosexual,â€ but because the peculiar configuration of their desires in relation to the dynamics of a particular historical moment drives them to it. Since â€œhuman natureâ€ is limitlessly malleable, human institutions like â€œmarriageâ€ and â€œfamilyâ€ lack a specific essence, and we may attach these terms to any arrangements that currently suit our fancy.
Katz and Goldberg, in other words, lay bare the hypocrisy of the claim that individuals are born with an innate and unchangeable â€œheterosexualâ€ or â€œhomosexualâ€ orientation.
Sex Has New Meaning
So our public language asserts the reality of â€œhomosexualityâ€ as a permanent condition, though there is little if anything in our history (Greek, Roman, and Christian) to justify the idea and even some â€œgayâ€ theorists do not accept it. The imposition upon an ingenuous public of the terms â€œhomosexualâ€ and â€œheterosexualâ€ required a prior bit of linguistic legerdemain, namely, the redefinition of â€œsexâ€ and the displacement of its principal original function by the term â€œgender.â€
Latin provides the root (sexus or secus, probably from â€œcutâ€ or â€œsever,â€ but more pertinently to â€œdivideâ€ or â€œhalveâ€) for the English word â€œsexâ€ and for its Romance language equivalents. Since the twentieth century, the word â€œsexâ€ first evokes the specific notion of sexual intercourse and everything associated with it rather than the simple division of a species into male and female, or the division of humanity into men and women. â€œSexâ€ now means primarily an activity rather than a state of being, as in the awkward and ugly, but ubiquitous, phrase, â€œhaving sexâ€ (of which the OED attributes the first usage to D. H. Lawrence in 1929).
Once â€œsexâ€ had acquired this new semantic profile, it became easier to substitute â€œgenderâ€ for â€œsexâ€ as the denomination of the difference between male and female, man and woman. If the first change, however, was the gradual result of recreation replacing reproduction as the principal association of â€œsexâ€ in Western culture, the introduction of â€œgenderâ€ as the differentiating term was deliberate and fraught with ideological baggage.
The first edition of the OED (1933) lists sporadic usages of â€œgenderâ€ for â€œsexâ€ from the fourteenth through the nineteenth centuries, but notes that such usage is â€œnow only jocular.â€ The second edition (1989) adds this to the entry: â€œIn mod. (esp. feminist) use a euphemism for the sex of a human being, often intended to emphasize the social and cultural, as opposed to the biological, distinctions between the sexes.â€ It gives 1963 as the date of the first such usage of â€œgender.â€
Before the sixties, â€œgenderâ€ was largely confined to marking the distinctions between â€œmasculine,â€ â€œfeminine,â€ and â€œneuterâ€ nouns and pronouns in various languages. The gender of a noun is quite often purely arbitrary or, if you will, â€œsocially constructedâ€; that is, there is no particular reason why the Spanish word for pen (la pluma) is â€œfeminineâ€ while a pencil (el lÃ¡piz) is â€œmasculine.â€ Or why in Latin, French, and Spanish the hand (manus, la main, la mano) is â€œfeminine,â€ while the foot (pes, le pied, el pie) is â€œmasculine.â€
The application of the term â€œgenderâ€ to the difference between men and women thus implies, without the argument ever being made, that the differential roles of men and women in family and society are as arbitrary as the gender of nouns. The routine use of â€œgenderâ€ to identify as men or women, test-takers, applicants for driverâ€™s licenses and insurance policies, and virtually all those who fill out almost any kind of document marks the bureaucratic imposition of the feminist view of the sexes on society as a whole.
Two linguistic developments over the past several decades have thus been effected by academic and media elites: â€œgenderâ€ has been substituted for â€œsexâ€ as the designation of the distinction between men and women, and â€œhomosexualâ€ and â€œheterosexualâ€ have been accepted as legitimate terms for distinguishable classes of persons.
The first development provides an official linguistic approval for the feminist notion that distinctions between men and women are based, not on the intrinsic nature of humankind, but on arbitrary social constructs. The second, conversely, asserts that the compulsion to commit sodomy results not from any disorder, moral, spiritual, or psychological, but from an inherent â€œhomosexualâ€ nature. Apart from the obvious contradiction, further ironies are involved in these verbal manipulations.
If â€œsexâ€ is understood in its proper sense, then â€œhomosexualâ€ and â€œheterosexualâ€ are senseless words. Etymologically, â€œsexâ€ means the â€œdifferenceâ€ or â€œdivisionâ€ that makes men and women separate and complementary. To link the unique Latin word sexus with the Greek word for â€œsameâ€ is a contradiction in termsâ€”an unnatural verbal conjunction. â€œHeterosexual,â€ on the other hand, is tautological: Sex, by definition, requires someone â€œotherâ€ or â€œdifferent.â€
Former President Clinton was technically correct in denying that he â€œhad sex with that woman.â€ What he was doing with Monica Lewinski did not require a woman, or even another human being. Orgasm can be reached by a variety of means, but only a man and a woman can engage in actual sexual intercourse and transform the physical difference into conjugal love: face-to-face in the much-maligned â€œmissionary position,â€ mutually acknowledging the personal identity of each spouse.
â€œHomosexualâ€ and â€œheterosexualâ€ can only make even a modicum of sense if â€œsexâ€ means nothing more than carnal coupling in its myriad ways and is no longer associated with the natural complementary relation of men and women. To have recourse to this definition is, however, to rely on the social-constructivist relativism that drives the sexual revolution, which is an absurd basis for the assertion that â€œhomosexualityâ€ is an innate condition.
To deny that marriage is natural does not make the contrary alternatives â€œnaturalâ€ in its stead (to assert thus is to commit the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent). If marriage is not natural, then nothing is, and the claim that a man is â€œhomosexualâ€ by nature undermines the very basis on which the term has been erected, because if â€œsexâ€ is no more than erotic acts and urges, nothing permanent or intrinsic can be built on the shifting sands of â€œgender.â€
Given the sinfulness of our nature and the mysterious blend of genetic features and external influences that shapes the specific character of particular human beings, it is probable that some individuals are, in fact, born with erotic proclivities toward persons of the same sex (or, for that matter, towards children or beasts or random promiscuity). Nevertheless, compulsive behavior arising from peculiar inclinations is not an adequate basis for establishing social institutions, much less for threatening those upon which society has long depended.
While men and women who are possessed by an urge to commit sodomy with others of the same sex should always be treated with justice and charity, they should not be allowed to determine the norms of moral discourse.
The words in which we express our ideas have consequences. To insist that words be used rationally and consistently is a first small step toward recovering moral reason. We should, therefore, refuse to accept â€œgenderâ€ as a relativistic substitute for the fundamental difference indicated by â€œsex,â€ while the latter term is expropriated to mean any kind of physical coupling. Above all, we should not acquiesce in the labels â€œheterosexualâ€ and â€œhomosexual,â€ when we are referring to men and women.
To concede the validity of such linguistic novelties is to allow the ideologues of the sexual revolution to control the terms of the debate. â€œMaleâ€ and â€œfemale,â€ â€œmasculineâ€ and â€œfeminine,â€ designate normative components of actual human nature: anatomical, physiological, affective, and rational.
â€œHomosexualityâ€ is now used to suggest that numerous urges and actions that deviate from these norms hold equivalent status as an element of human nature, but the peculiar use of a natural organ or faculty does not change its nature. A man can walk around on his hands, but that does not turn hands into feet; and society ought not to be obliged to redesign sidewalks and staircases to accommodate compulsive â€œhandwalkersâ€ (manambulants?), even if they are born with the inclination.
No really existing class of persons of a specific, distinct nature corresponds to the word â€œhomosexualâ€ in the way that men and women are distinct, complementary kinds of human being. A claim for specific â€œhomosexual rightsâ€ is, therefore, frivolous, and the word is merely an ideological construct aimed at undermining the sexual norms inscribed in human nature.
The references are, in order, to: K. J. Doverâ€™s Greek Homosexuality (Harvard University Press, 1978 & 1989); Platoâ€™s Symposium 189câ€“193d (Aristophanes), 198bâ€“212b (Diotima), 180dâ€“183e (Pausanias); St. Thomas Aquinasâ€™s Summa Theologicae II 154 11 & 12 ad 4 and De Malo XV ad 7; Fasciculus Morum VII.Xi; Chaucer X.909; Reclaiming Sodom, edited by Jonathan Goldberg (Routledge, 1994), pp. 49, 58, and 1; Symposium 190b.
Sex with a Difference
While the appropriation of â€œsexâ€ as a generic term for erotic activity only takes hold in the twentieth century, John Donneâ€™s Songs & Sonets deploys the word in ways that sound suspiciously modern. The speaker of â€œThe Extasie,â€ for example, assures his beloved that the origin of their love is â€œnot sexe,â€ which could be taken as a term for erotic gratification. The usage of the word in â€œThe Relique,â€ however, suggests that there is more to it than that: â€œDifference of sex no more we knew,/ Then our Guardian Angells doe.â€
Although for Donne and his seventeenth-century readers, â€œsexâ€ has erotic overtones, it is anchored in â€œdifference of sex.â€ The complexity of the concept of sexâ€”the way it sets carnal coupling in a context of the natural division of men and womenâ€”emerges in another Donne lyric, â€œThe Primroseâ€:
For should my true-Love lesse then woman bee,
She were scarce any thing; and then, should she
Be more then woman, shee would get above
All thought of sexe, and thinke to move
My heart to study her, and not to love.
It is difficult to imagine even so racy a poet as Donne availing himself of our very modern derivative â€œsexy,â€ with its suggestion of shameless provocation attached to abject want of inhibition. Donne and his readers understood that â€œsexâ€ in the modern sense is more gratifying if an expression of the difference of the sexes: that we cannot properly speak of sex in one sense without speaking of sex in the other.
â€” R. V. Young
R. V. Young is Professor of English at North Carolina State University. His most recent book is Doctrine and Devotion in Seventeenth-Century Poetry (Boydell & Brewer), and he is currently at work on a book on Shakespeare and on a translation and critical edition of the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsiusâ€™s De Constantia. He and his wife, who are parishioners at St. Josephâ€™s Catholic Church in Raleigh, have five grown children and eight grandchildren.
Copyright Â© 2005 the Fellowship of St. James. All rights reserved.