Does Just War Doctrine Require Moral Certainty?

By Edward Feser, First Things.

Pope Leo XIV has made it clear that the U.S. war on Iran does not, in his judgment, meet the criteria of just war doctrine. Timothy Broglio, archbishop for the U.S. Military Services, has said the same, as have several other American bishops. I have argued that the war’s violation of just war conditions is manifest. That conviction has only been strengthened in the month since, as the Trump administration has made evident that it had no feasible plan to avoid plunging the world into entirely foreseeable economic chaos, has deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure, and even threatened that “a whole civilization will die” if demands are not met.

Some Catholics disagree with this peremptory judgment. But the more sober among them, while making a case for the war, acknowledge that the conflict is problematic. For example, Rusty Reno identifies both the possible advantages and the potential downsides to military action, and concludes that “it is unwise to issue confident moral judgments” about the war. Robert Royal says he’s “not sure” whether the war is just, but appears to think that those who “already claim to know” ought to “suspend judgment.” Francis X. Maier defends the war but acknowledges that it is “debatable” whether it is just.

These arguments imply that just war doctrine allows one to support a war as long as some plausible argument can be given for it, even if not a conclusive argument. This is not the case. What has long been the standard teaching in the Catholic just war tradition is that the probability of a war’s being just is not good enough. The case for the justice of a proposed war must be morally certain. Otherwise, it is morally wrong to initiate the conflict. It follows that, if writers like Reno, Royal, and Maier acknowledge that the case for the war is debatable at best, then they should oppose the war.

Read here.